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Abstract
We propose a quantum-enhanced protocol to authenticate classical messages, with improved
security with respect to the classical scheme introduced by Brassard in 1983. In that protocol, the
shared key is the seed of a pseudo-random generator (PRG) and a hash function is used to create
the authentication tag of a public message. We show that a quantum encoding of secret bits offers
more security than the classical XOR function introduced by Brassard. Furthermore, we establish
the relationship between the bias of a PRG and the amount of information about the key that
the attacker can retrieve from a block of authenticated messages. Finally, we prove that quantum
resources can improve both the secrecy of the key generated by the PRG and the secrecy of the
tag obtained with a hidden hash function.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The authentication of public messages is a fundamental problem nowadays for bipartite
and network communications. The scenario is the following: Alice sends a (classical) message
to Bob through a public channel, together with an authentication tag through a private or
public channel. The tag will allow Bob to verify if the message he received via the public
channel has been tampered with or if it is indeed the authentic message, originally sent by
Alice. A third character, Eve, wants to sabotage this scheme by intercepting Alice’s message
and sending her own message to Bob, together with a false tag which will convince Bob he
is receiving the authentic message. For instance, one could imagine that Alice is sending
to Bob her bank account number, to which Bob will transfer some money, and Eve wants
to interfere in the communication in such a way that Bob will receive her bank account
number believing it is Alice’s one, thus giving his money to Eve. The use of authentication
tags allows to separate the secrecy problem in message transmission from the authentication
problem and it is useful even if a secure communication channel is available [2].
In 1983, G. Brassard proposed a computationally secure scheme of classical authentication
tags based on the sharing of short secret keys [1]. Brassard’s scheme is itself an improvement
of the Wegman-Carter protocol [2]. Brassard showed that a relatively short seed of a PRG
can be used as a secret key shared between Alice and Bob which will allow the exchange
of computationally secure authentication tags. This method yields a much more practical
protocol, where the requirements on the seed length grow reasonably with the number of
messages we want to authenticate, as opposed to the Wegman-Carter proposal.
The security of PRGs is based on the alleged hardness of some problems of number
theory, e.g., the factorization of a large number with classical computers. However, several
of these problems are provably solvable if quantum computers are available. Consequently,
the security of the PRGs might be compromised. Assuming Alice and Bob communicate
quantically, can Eve yet menacing the PRG security? This question is our main motivation
to write this article.
In this work, we extend Brassard’s protocol to include quantum-encoded authentication
tags, which we prove will offer, under certain conditions, information-theoretical security for
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the authentication of classical messages. We observe that our scheme can authenticate the
quantum channel itself, which is an important part of the quantum cryptography: in fact,
it is the crucial first step of quantum key distribution protocols.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we set up basic notation, briefly review the description of the Brassard’s
protocol and describe our new proposal. We conclude the section with a negative result
on the robustness of an attackable PRG when its output is hidden by a specific quantum
coding.
We denote M the set of messages and T the set of tags, where log |M| >> log |T |.
As hash functions are an important ingredient for all protocols described here we start by
presenting their formal definition [6]:
Definition II.1 (ε− almost strongly universal-2 hash functions) Let M and T be
finite sets and call functions from M to T hash functions. Let ε be a positive real number.
A set H of hash functions is ε−almost strongly universal-2 if the following two conditions
are satisfied
1) The number of hash functions in H that takes an arbitrary m ∈ M to an arbitrary
t ∈ T is exactly |H|/|T |.
2) The fraction of those functions that also takes Y ′ 6= Y in M to an arbitrary T ′ ∈ T
(possibly equal to T ) is no more than ε.
The number ε is related to the probability of guessing the correct tag with respect to an
arbitrary message Y . Notice that the smaller ε is, the larger is |H|. For additional details
X(n) X = {X i }
Z =  X T
U (l)
PRG
hAlice XOR
Public Channel
BobEve
Y T=h(Y)
FIG. 1: Brassard’s classical authentication protocol [1]
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on universal-2 functions we point the reader to [2]. Brassard’s protocol (see Figure 1) makes
use of two secret keys. The first one, U (l), specifies a fixed universal-2 hash function h ∈ H,
where l = ⌈log |H|⌉. The second specifies the seed X(n) ∈ Zn2 , for a PRG, a sequence of n bits.
The main ingredient of our first quantum-enhanced protocol proposed here (see Figure 2) is
replacing the classical gate XOR of Brassard protocol by a quantum encoder similar to that
used in the BB84 protocol [11]. After some developments, we shall verify that the key U (l)
is no longer necessary. Assume that Alice and Bob agree on two orthonormal bases B0 and
B1 for the 2-dimensional Hilbert space,
B0 = {|0〉, |1〉} and B1 =
{
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)
}
These bases will be used to prepare four quantum states. We shall refer to this preparation
process as quantum coding. For each bit of the k = ⌈log |T |⌉ bits long tag TY = h(Y ), Alice
prepares a quantum state |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 (Xi, (TY )i) determined by the bit Xi from the PRG and
the corresponding bit (TY )i of 2-radix representation of the tag TY . Then, if the bit Xi = 0,
Alice prepares |ψ〉 using basis B0, such that
|ψ〉 =


|0〉 if (TY )i = 0
|1〉 if (TY )i = 1.
(1)
Similarly, if the bit Xi = 1, Alice prepares |ψ〉 using basis B1, such that
|ψ〉 =


|+〉 if (TY )i = 0
|−〉 if (TY )i = 1
(2)
After the qubits generation, Alice sends the separable state |ψY 〉⊗k to Bob through a noiseless
quantum channel and the message Y through an unauthenticated classical channel. At the
reception, Bob performs measurements to obtain a sequence of k bits from the quantum
encoded version of h(Y ). For the i-th received qubit, Bob measures it using the basis B0
or B1 depending on the i−th bit of X is 0 or 1, respectively, recovering a k-bit long string
T ′ = h′
(|ψ〉⊗k).
Because the quantum channel is assumed to be perfect, Bob recognizes that the message
is authentic if h′ = h(YB), where YB is the message received from the classical channel.
Otherwise, Bob assumes that Eve tried to send him an unauthentic message. This concludes
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the authentication protocol for one message. Throughout this article it is always assumed
that the above coding rule is public.
Even though we assume a noise-free quantum channel, we observe that if the quantum
channel is noisy, the only piece of information requiring error-protecting coding is the block
of bits (TY )i of the tag TY . The sequence of bases to be prepared by Alice and Bob is
known a priori, determined locally by the sequence of bits from the PRG. A future task is
evaluating the effects of the utilization of error-correcting codes to the bits of TY .
X(n) X = {X i }
ψi{ }
POVM
U(l)
PRG
hAlice QC
Classical Public Channel
Eve
Bob
Y T = h(Y)
FIG. 2: First proposal of quantum-enhanced authentication scheme
In a warning against alleged collective attacks, we notice that our analysis allows Eve
to make general procedures (suggested in Figure 2 by the block labeled POVM) without
being detected. Our results are robust to such powerful and unrealistic assumption for the
attacker. Note that our quantum scheme aims at minimizing the key length for one-way
transmission. Another example of such an approach is given in [15]. Next we focus on
crucial aspects of the PRGs.
Weak pseudo-random generators
Clearly, it is important to understand how secure the authentication code described above
is. As we shall see, the security of the authentication code is deeply related with to quality
of the pseudo-random generator. The quality of a pseudo-random generator is evaluated
by the hardness to discriminate its pseudo-random sequence output from a truly random
sequence or by the hardness to find its seed. The first quality evaluation relates to the PRG’s
robustness against distinguishing attacks, the second relates to the so-called state recovery
attacks. In [8] it is shown that a state recovery attack is a subclass of the distinguishing
attacks.
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As a matter of fact, if the pseudo-random generator can be attacked by a quantum
computer so does the authentication code. To set this result we refer to Figure 3, that
describes a simple scheme to assist us the proof. In this scheme, we simply allow Eve to
compare a sequence {Yi} of classical bits with the corresponding sequence {Zi} obtained
from the measurement apparatus POVM.
Recall that a pseudo-random generator is a polynomial-time family of functions G =
{Gn : Zn2 ×N→ Z2}n∈N where Z2 is the set {0, 1} and Gn is the pseudo-generator for seeds
with size n, that is, Gn(X
(n), i) returns the i-th bit generated from n bits long seed X(n).
Pseudo-random generators are expected to fulfill an indistinguishability property that we
will not detail here for the sake of simplicity (more details on [7]). In the following definition
we write Xp(n) =
(
G(X(n), i1), G(X
(n), i2), . . . , G(X
(n), ip(n))
)
to denote a subsequence of
p(n) (not necessarily contiguous) bits generated by G.
Definition II.2 We say that a pseudo-random generatorG is attackable in (quantum/proba-
bilistic) polynomial time if there exists a (quantum/probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm
P and polynomial p such that if P is fed with a subsequence of p(n) (not necessarily con-
tiguous) generated bits Xp(n) of G we have that:
H(X(n)|P (Xp(n))) ∈ O(2−n).
For a pseudo-random generator to be attackable, there must exist an algorithm (quantum
or probabilistic) that receives a subsequence of p(n) generated bits (not necessarily contigu-
ous) and is able to compute the seed up to a negligible uncertainty. We observe that the
security/randomness of the pseudo-random generator can not be grounded in the fact that
the attack can only be performed to a contiguous subsequence of generated bits. This is
due to the fact that the generator could always hide some bits if the attack required this
type of sequences. A simple example of a pseudo-random generator that can be attackable
in polynomial time are the pseudo-number generators based on linear congruence [8].
Theorem II.3 If a pseudo-random generator G is attackable in (quantum/probabilistic)
polynomial time then the scheme presented in Figure 3 is not secure in polynomial-time for
a quantum adversary that has access to Y = {Yi}.
Proof. Since G is attackable there exists a quantum polynomial time algorithm P and a
polynomial p such that if P is fed with p(n) bits of the string X generated by G then P
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X(n) X = {X i }
Y = {Y i } |ψ i
PRG
+ x
QC
Alice
Classical Public Channel
POVM
Eve
Z
FIG. 3: Auxiliary scheme for Theorem II.3 proof
computes (up to negligible uncertainty) the seed X(n) of G. So it is enough to show that
Eve, upon capturing the qubits generated by QC, is able to recover (with non-negligible
probability) p(n) bits of X .
Indeed, assume that Eve has captured 8p(n) qubits |ψ〉i, i : 1 . . . 8p(n) and has measured
them in a random basis (that is, either the computational or the diagonal basis). Eve can
now verify if Zi = Yi. If this occurs Eve does not now if the basis chose to encode the Yi bit
was the basis she measured or if she got with 1
2
probability the correct bit due to encoding
in the other basis. However, if the outcome is different (that is, Yi 6= Zi ), then she knows
that the basis at the i − th bit is the basis she did not choose the measure, because no
mismatch would be possible if the encoding was performed with the same basis. In the
latter case, she knows that Xi is either 0 or 1 depending if she measured in the diagonal
or the computational basis, respectively. Moreover, this happens with 1/4 probability. So
the probability of Eve not obtaining p(n) elements of X by measuring 8p(n) qubits is given
by the cumulative function of a binomial distribution with 1/4 Bernoulli trial, 8p(n) trials
and success of at most p(n). By Hoeffding’s inequality this probability is upper-bounded
by exp
(
−2 (8p(n)/4−p(n))2
p(n)
)
)
= exp(−2p(n)) which decreases exponentially with n, and so in
other words, Eve has an exponentially increasing probability of obtaining p(n) bits of X
with 8p(n) qubits measurements. Since G is attackable by knowing p(n) bits of X , Eve is
able to perform this attack up to negligible probability. 
Corollary 1 If a pseudo-random generator G is attackable then the scheme presented in
Figure 2 is not secure in polynomial-time for a quantum adversary that has access to hash
function h.
Proof. Eve is able to calculate h(Y ) from Y that is public. Therefore she can apply
Theorem II.3 by observing a number N of tags such that N log |T | ≥ 8p(n). 
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Although Theorem II.3 points that the quantum coding of Figure 3 is not better asymp-
totically than the classical coding (where we simply replace the quantum coder QC by a XOR
gate), it seems harder to attack the quantum scheme. We will now show that this is true
for the simple case where the encoder is fed by an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Bernoulli sequence. The following example illustrates that this is true even for a
very simple generator.
Example II.4 (State Recovery Attack for Linear Congruential Generator(LCG))
Let A be a positive integer and ZA the set of integers modulo A. The seed of the LCG is
the vector X(n) = (A, s0, a, b), where s0, a, b ∈ ZA. The length of the seed is n = 4⌈logA⌉.
A binary pseudorandom sequence with length N ×⌈logA⌉ bits is obtained from the 2-radix
expansion of the sequence s = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} created by the following recursion:
si = asi−1 + b mod A, i = 2, 3, . . . , N (3)
It is well known (see [8]) that for all i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 3, the numbers
δi = det


si si+1 1
si+1 si+2 1
si+2 si+3 1


are multiple of A. As a consequence, the greatest common divisor GCD of some δ′is gives
the value of A. The rest of the seed, that is a, b and s0, follow then from a system of linear
equations. In practice five values of δi are enough.
Figure 4(right) displays a simplified version of the scheme shown in Figure 3, where X
stands for the pseudo-random sequence from the output of the PRG. The left side of Figure 4
displays the situation when a gate XOR is utilized. We notice that the state recovery attack
is applicable without change to the XOR-based scheme. It is enough to compute X = Z ⊕ Y
before applying the algorithm. In contrast, for the quantum scheme, Eve is submitted to
an irreducible uncertainty on the X values due to quantum coding. In particular, if she
employs the procedure described in the proof of the Theorem II.3 it is expected only one
fourth of the X ’s are expected to be correct. The problem from Eve’s point of view is how
to solve the seed from a degraded version of the algorithm input X .
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III. COMPARING XOR WITH QUANTUM CODING
In the last section we have considered the problem of the state recovering attack and
defined the weakness of a PRG. In this section we make a rigorous comparison between the
XOR and the quantum coding performances using information-theoretical measures. To this
Y Z
Y
X
XOR
ψY QC POVM
Z
Y
X
FIG. 4: XOR (left) and quantum coding (right)
end consider Figure 4 where both classical and quantum encodings are displayed. The QC
denotes the quantum encoder defined before, in (1) and (2), where X is the variable that sets
the basis. The block POVM stands for the measurement apparatus defined by the positive
operator-valued measure
Z = {Em(Y )}m∈O
where O is the set of outcomes. Observe that the measurement may depend on the message
Y , which is public. The goal of Eve is to maximize the knowledge of X , that is, minimize
the entropy H(X|Y, Z).
We consider the classical and quantum scheme presented in Figure 4 in two ways: Firstly,
we will assume that X is a sequence of fair and independent Bernoulli random variables,
that is, the PRG describing X is perfect. Secondly, we consider a biased PRG (unfair) to
describe X and introduce blocks of random variables into the analysis.
Fair input single-sized block
We start with the simple case of a single-sized block and where X ∼ Ber (1
2
)
. In the
classical XOR encoding case we have that Z = X ⊕ Y and thus H(X|Y, Z) = 0, and so Eve
has no doubt about X . In the quantum encoding case, the Holevo bound states that
I(X ;Z|Y ) ≤ S(ρ(Y ))−
1∑
i=0
1
2
S(|φi(Y )〉〈φi(Y )|) (4)
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where ρ(Y ) is the density operator describing the encoding by QC that is
ρ(Y ) =
1
2
|φ0(Y )〉〈φ0(Y )|+ 1
2
|φ1(Y )〉〈φ1(Y )|, (5)
where |φ0(0)〉 = |0〉, |φ1(0)〉 = |+〉, |φ0(1)〉 = |1〉 and |φ1(1)〉 = |−〉.
We shall need a well known property of the von Neumann entropy (see [4] for more
details).
Proposition III.1 Let ρ be a quantum state and S(ρ) its entropy, then S(ρ) ≥ 0, and the
equality holds iff ρ is a pure state.
Thus, thanks to Proposition III.1 we can simplify (4) to
I(X ;Z|Y ) ≤ S(ρ(Y )). (6)
Moreover, one can compute easily the von Neumann entropy of S(ρ(Y )) = S(ρ(0)) = S(ρ(1))
and is
S∗ = S(ρ(Y )) = −2 cos2
(pi
8
)
log
(
cos
(pi
8
))
− 2 log
(
sin
(pi
8
))
sin2
(pi
8
)
. (7)
And so, since H(X|Z, Y ) = H(X|Y ) − I(X ;Z|Y ) and H(X|Y ) = 1, the minimum uncer-
tainty that Eve may attain about X is given by
H (X|Y, Z) = 1− S(ρ(Y )). (8)
The Holevo bound can be achieved by a simple von Neumann measurement [12, pp.421]
described by the Hermitian
A = 0|ψθ〉〈ψθ|+ 1|ψ⊥θ 〉〈ψ⊥θ | (9)
with ψθ = cos(θ)|0〉+ sin(θ)|1〉, ψ⊥θ = sin(θ)|0〉 − cos(θ)|1〉 and θ = −pi8 .
Fair input k-blocks
First, consider the classical setup, then H(Xk|Y k, Zk) = 0 , since the block Xk is com-
pletely determined from the knowledge of Y k and Zk.
For the quantum setup, the subsystem that Eve owns is described by
ρY k =
k⊗
i=1
(
1
2
|φ0(Yi)〉〈φ0(Yi)|+ 1
2
|φ1(Yi)〉〈φ1(Yi)|
)
. (10)
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By the Holevo bound we get that
H
(
Xk|Y k, Zk) ≥ H(Xk)− S(ρY k). (11)
Example III.2 Table I illustrates the scenario for k = 2. Rows are indexed by the four
possible values of Y 2 and columns are indexed by the bases corresponding to the four values
of X2. Notice that Eve is not able to distinguish which column is being used. Then, her
uncertainty is lower bounded by the von Neumann entropy of the quantum system formed
by states listed in row indexed by the values of Y 2 that she can access.
TABLE I: Encoding for blocks of length 2
Bases
Y
2
B0B0 B0B1 B1B0 B1B1
00 |00〉 |0+〉 |+ 0〉 |++〉
01 |01〉 |0−〉 |+ 1〉 |+−〉
10 |10〉 |1+〉 | − 0〉 | −+〉
11 |11〉 |1−〉 | − 1〉 | − −〉
Recall the following property concerning the von Neumann entropy.
Proposition III.3 Let ρ and σ be quantum states, then S (ρ⊗ σ) = S(ρ) + S(σ).
As a consequence of Equation (10) and Proposition III.3, for a sequence of fair Bernoullis
we have
S(ρY k) = kS
∗, (12)
where S∗ is given by (8). So we have that
H
(
Xk|Y k, Zk) ≥ k − kS∗. (13)
Again, the equality can be achieved by a simple von Neumann measurement, namely that
defined by A⊗k. This is the best scenario one can imagine to defeat Eve. However, for
the protocol to be practical, the X ′s should be generated by a PRG, which is the case we
examine next.
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Unfair input k-blocks
The results above where obtained assuming that {Xi} was a sequence of i.i.d. fair
Bernoulli random variables. In this section we study the general case, with the purpose
of clarifying how the use of a real PRG affects the uncertainty about X .
Consider k−length blocks Xk, Y k and Zk, where Xk = Xi+1, Xi+2, . . . , Xi+k is a contigu-
ous subsequence of {Xi} and similarly to Y k and Zk. Note that, to ease notation, we omit
the index i in defining Xk. However, it is crucial to remark that the probability distribution
of Xk is, in general, dependent on i. As a matter of fact, pXk = (p0, p2, . . . , p2k−1) can
even degenerate to a distribution with a single component equal to 1, depending on the
robustness of the PRG. We shall simplify the notation denoting pXk by p.
Concerning the unfairness of {Xi}, the best strategy for Eve to get information from Xk
is to prepare a measurement (POVM) over the all k qubits sent, given that she knows Y k.
Again, the Holevo bound gives us
H
(
Xk|Y k, Zk) ≥ H(Xk)− S(ρY k) = H(Xk)−H(λ) (14)
where λ = (λ1 . . . λ2k) is the spectrum of ρY k and
ρY k =
2k−1∑
j=0
pj|φj〉〈φj| (15)
where the states |φj〉 = ⊗ki=1|φji(Yi)〉 and ji is the i-th bit of the binary representation of j.
Note that ρY k is a mixture of pure states weighted by the probabilities pj , j ∈ {0, . . . , 2k−1}.
Accordingly, we write pj = Pr[X
k = j] where j is seen in its binary representation (e.g., for
k = 2, p0 = Pr[X
2 = 00], p1 = Pr[X
2 = 01], . . .). Observe that S(ρY k1 ) = S(ρY k2 ) since
there exist a unitary transformation U such that UρY k1 U
−1 = ρY k2 .
We now establish a relationship between the probability vectors pXk and the lower bound
given in Equation (14).
Denote by ρ the uniform distribution, that is, qj = 1/2
k, j = 0, . . . , 2k−1. In this section
we shall verify that if the probability distribution of a block Xk from the PRG, say p, is
near enough the distribution ρ, for a block of size k, then the lower bound of (14) will be
kept significantly near of k − kS∗, which is the best one can achieve.
Let σY k be the density operator corresponding to a k−length block Xk generated by a
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fair Bernoulli sequence given that the k-length block Y k is known, that is
σY k =
2k−1∑
j=0
qj |φj〉〈φj|. (16)
In this section we establish some results relating von Neumann entropy with the trace
distance D (ρY k , σY k) between ρY k and σY k . Recall that the trace distance between two
quantum states ρ and σ is defined by
D(ρ, σ) =
1
2
tr |ρ− σ|
where |A| =
√
A†A. We shall also need the trace distance between probability vectors, say
a and b, defined by
D(a,b) =
1
2
∑
j
|aj − bj |.
The trace distance can be used to measure how biased a probability distribution is com-
pared to a fair Bernoulli sampling. Given a probability distribution p, we call the bias of p
the value B(p) = D(p, ρ) where ρ is the uniform distribution.
Proposition III.4 Let ε > 0 be an arbitrary real number. If
B (p) ≤ ε (17)
then
D (ρY k , σY k) ≤ ε (18)
where ρY k is the state defined in Equation (15).
Proof. Denote γj = |φj〉〈φj|. From the strong convexity of the trace distance we have:
D

2
k−1∑
j=0
pjγj,
2k−1∑
j=0
1
2k
γj

 ≤ D (p, ρ) +
2k−1∑
j=0
pjD (γj, γj) (19)
= D (p, ρ) (20)
which concludes the proof. 
In the proof of the next proposition we shall apply Fannes’ inequality (see [14] for more
details about this equality):
|S(ρ)− S(σ)| ≤ 2D (ρ, σ) ln
(
N
2D(ρ, σ)
)
(21)
where it is assumed that D(ρ, σ) ≤ 1/(2e) and N is the dimension of the Hilbert space
dimension where the states live in.
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Theorem III.5 If the conditions in Proposition III.4 hold, that is, if B(p) ≤ ε, then
|H(Xk)− S (ρY k)− (H(Xk)− S (σk))| = |S (ρY k)− S (σk) | (22)
≤ 2ln2(k − 1)ε+ 2εln1
ε
. (23)
Proof. Observe that the function −xlnx is monotonous in the interval (0, 1/e). Therefore,
assuming 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1/e and for N = 2k, we have:
|S (ρY k)− S (σk) |
(a)
≤ 2D(ρY k , σk)ln
2k
2D(ρY k , σk)
(b)
= 2ln2(k − 1)D(ρY k , σk) + 2D(ρY k , σk)ln
1
D(ρY k , σk)
(24)
(c)
≤ 2ln2 (k − 1)ε+ 2εln1
ε
(25)
where (a) results from Fannes’ inequality, (b) is due to logarithm properties and, (c) is due
to Proposition III.4. 
This result states that if a PRG is such that the probability distribution of its output Xk,
say, p (possibly conditioned on the past), is near enough the fair distribution ρ, then Eve’s
uncertainty is kept near the maximum H
(
Xk|Y k, Zk) = k − kS∗ (see Equation (13)).
Note that the distribution of p is induced by the random secret seed of the PRG, X(n),
which is chosen with uniform distribution. Consequently, any practical use of Equation (23)
will depend on the Eve’s capability to estimate that distribution and clearly, on the PRG
being used. For instance, suppose we want to upper bound the right side of (23) with a given
tolerance defined by a positive real number δ. After some simple algebraic manipulation we
obtain that
k < 1 +
1
2ln2
(
δ
ε
)
− ln
(
1
ε
)
ln2
. (26)
For the case of ε = δ we get the simple bound
k < 1 +
1
2ln2
− ln
(
1
ε
)
ln2
≤ 1 + 1
2ln2
+
(
1
ε
)− 1
ln2
≤ 1 + 1
εln4
. (27)
Additionally, when the conditions of Proposition III.4 hold, that is, for bias B(p) < ε,
we can rewrite (26) as
k < 1 +
1
2ln2
(
δ
B(p)
)
− ln (1/B(p))
ln2
. (28)
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Note that the right-hand side of (28) approximates 1
2ln2
(
δ
B(p)
)
as B(p) tends to zero. In
detail, Equation (28), at the light of Theorem III.5, provides a way to compute the largest
block whose uncertainty remains near k − kS∗ (up to ε), given an upper bound of the bias
of p. However, a word of advice is necessary: from its very definition, p depends on k and
also on the position i the block start, because Xk = Xi+1, Xi+2, . . . , Xi+k. So, the use of
Equation (28) to establish a bound of a secure block relies on a bias difficult to compute for
standard PRG’s.
The following corollary clarifies the meaning of Theorem III.5 from an asymptotic point
of view.
Corollary 2 Given a PRG, let p be the probability distribution of a k-length generated
block, and let f(k, n) and g(n) positive functions such that:
• limn→∞ g(n) = +∞
• limn→∞ g(n)f(g(n), n) = 0.
Then, if B(pPRG) ≤ f(k, n) and k ≤ g(n),
lim
n→∞
|S (ρY g(n))− S
(
σg(n)
) | = 0.
We now discuss the results above. The idea is that n is the size of the seed of the PRG
and k is the size of the block. If one chooses k ≤ g(n) for some g and the bias of the PRG is
smaller the f(k, n) for some f fulfilling the conditions of Corollary 2, then the information
Eve can retrieve from blocks of size g(n) is as close to the ideal case as desired, just be
choosing a larger n. A good PRG is one for which n << g(n), so that the block size could
be larger than the seed and still, little information about the seed is revealed.
In the next section we make a comparison between classical XOR and quantum QC Bras-
sard’s schemes for authentication of classical messages.
IV. IMPROVING KEY-TAG SECRECY
In the last section we compared Eve’s equivocation on X for the XOR and QC schemes when
she has access both to the message Y and its quantum encoded version, which she observes
from the quantum channel. We concluded that the equivocation is kept above some lower
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bound depending on the quality of the PRG. In this section we include a hash function h in
the scheme (see Figure 5) in such a way that Eve only accesses the public message Y and
the quantum encoded version of the tag T = h(Y ). Thanks to that modification we shall
demonstrate that is feasible to improve the secrecy of the key and of the tag simultaneously.
By information-theoretic secrecy, as usually, we mean I(W ;V ) = 0 + O(2−n) or equiva-
lently, the equivocation H(W |V ) = H(W )−O(2−n), where W is the secret to be protected
and V is the piece of data available to the eavesdropper. Our derivations will focus in
the equivocation H(W | V ) to measure the quality of the scheme. Then, the information
to be protected is W =
(
T,Xk
)
and the information available, from Eve’s viewpoint, is
V = (Y, Z). We investigate the uncertainty of the tag H(T | Y, Z) and the uncertainty of
the key H(Xk | Y, Z). We assume that Xk, is independent of the message Y and that the
X(n) X = {X i }
ψi
X k
POVM
PRG
Alice QCh
EveBob
ZT=h(Y)Y
Classical Public Channel
FIG. 5: Authentication scheme with a single key X(n)
hash function is selected from the ε−almost universal-2 class of hash functions, which we
refer in the following just as hash functions.
Modified classical case
Consider a simple modified setup where a XOR gate is taken in place of the QC block in
the scheme displayed in Figure 5.
If {Xi} is a fair Bernoulli and a k−block of bits such that k = max{⌈log |T |⌉, ⌈log |H|⌉ }
it is utilized per message, then the scheme turns to be equivalent to the Wegman-Carter
one-time pad scheme. Indeed, in this situation h is in fact drawn uniformly from H, then
H
(
T,Xk|Y, Zk) (a)= H(T |Y, Zk) +H(Xk|T, Y, Zk) (29)
(b)
= H(T |Y, Zk) (30)
(c)
= H (T |Y ) (31)
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(d)
= log | T | . (32)
Where equality (a) is due to chain rule for Shannon entropy, (b) is due to the fact that in the
classical setup Xk = T ⊕Zk. The equality (c) is harder to obtain, indeed it follows from the
properties of the ε−almost universal-2 class of hash function. Note that T = hXk(Y ) has a
uniform distribution. Moreover T |xk = hxk(Y ) has also uniform distribution, and therefore,
T is independent of Xk. Since Zk = f(Xk, Y ) we have thatH(T |Y, Zk) = H(T |Y ). Equality
(d) is also due to the properties of hash functions. On the other hand, if {Xi} comes from a
PRG, the Eve’s uncertainty on the tag can, eventually, decreases by observing the random
variable Zk. Indeed, in general, H
(
T |Y, Zk) < H (T |Y ). Consequently, unconditional
secrecy relative to T , H(T |Y, Zk) = log |T | cannot be assured.
Uncertainty of the tag in the quantum case
In this subsection we introduce a condition to attain unconditional security of the tag in
terms of conditioned mutual information between T and the k−block of bits of the key.
Proposition IV.1 If I
(
T ;Xk|Y, Zk) = H(T ) then the tag is secure in the information
theoretical sense, that is, H(T |Y, Zk) = H(T ).
Proof.
From the standard chain rule of Shannon entropy we have:
H
(
T,Xk | Y, Zk) = H (Xk | Y, Zk)+H (T | Xk, Y, Zk) (33)
= H
(
T |Y, Zk)+H (Xk|T, Y, Zk) . (34)
Then, comparing (33) and (34) we obtain
H
(
T |Y, Zk) (a)= H (T |Xk, Y, Zk)+
H
(
Xk|Y, Zk)−H (Xk|T, Y, Zk) (35)
(b)
= H
(
T |Xk, Y, Zk)+ I (T ;Xk|Y, Zk) (36)
(c)
= I
(
T ;Xk|Y, Zk) (37)
Where (a) is due to a simple manipulation of (33) and (34), (b) is definition of mutual
information and (c) follows because the hash function is determined by Xk and so, then
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T = h(Y ) is immediately calculated. That is, H(T |Xk, Y, Zk) = H(T |Xk, Y, T = h(Y )) = 0.
The results follows from (37). 
Eq. (37) clearly indicates that in order to increase Eve’s uncertainty about T we must max-
imize the mutual information between the block Xk and the tag T. This is the information-
theoretical hint that motivates the scheme presented in Figure 5. Note that in this case we
make the tag T depend of Xk, increasing thus their mutual information. In Brassard scheme
(see Figure 1) the hash function is fixed in the beginning, and therefore I
(
T ;Xk|V ′) = 0
where V ′ is the observation that Eve can perform in Brassard’s scheme.
It is remarkable to be possible to attain unconditional security of the tag using non-fair
Bernoulli for X with the proposed of Figure 5. This fact is in sharp contrast with the
classical setup for which only Bernoulli sequences can assure that requirement.
Thus, a good approximation is to use PRG for the sequence of X , and the mutual
information I(T ;XK|Y, Zk) is as high as the PRG is unbiased, since that mutual information
is mediated by the random variable Zk.
It is clear that, if we are dealing with real PRGs (that do not generate a sequence of fair
Bernoullis), then the conditions of Theorem III.5 should be considered in order to evaluate
the number of messages that can be authenticated before leaking too much information.
Another possibility to apply the scheme of Figure 5 is to spend just k = log |T | key bits
per message to protect the current tag. This approach is similar to Brassard’s scheme, but
improves it since the tag is protected by the quantum coding. Observe that as log |T | <
log |H|, this scheme is less costly in terms of key consumption.
Uncertainty of the key in the quantum case
In this case, the bounds derived in Section III remain valid, namely the inequality (14)
that we recall
H
(
Xk|Y k, Zk) ≥ H(Xk)− S(ρY k) = H(Xk)−H(λ). (38)
In this case, since the measurement Zk is on the quantum encoding of the tag, and not on
the quantum encoding of Y , the uncertainty is greater than that of the case discussed in
Section III.
So, with the scheme of Figure 5, not only we obtain a high equivocation about the tag,
but we also increase the uncertainty of the sequence Xk and, therefore, also of the seed X(n)
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of the PRG. Observe that Theorem III.5 and inequality 26 are also valid for this scheme,
and can be used to get bounds about the size of k for which a threshold of information is
leaked to Eve.
V. SUMMARY
In this work we have investigated how quantum resources can improve the security of
Brassard’s classical message authentication protocol. We have started by showing that a
quantum coding of secret bits offers more security than the classical XOR function introduced
by Brassard. Then, we have used this quantum coding to propose a quantum-enhanced pro-
tocol to authenticate classical messages, with improved security with respect to the classical
scheme introduced by Brassard in 1983. Our protocol is also more practical in the sense
that it requires a shorter key than the classical scheme by using the pseudorandom bits to
choose the hash function. We then establish the relationship between the bias of a PRG
and the amount of information about the key that the attacker can retrieve from a block
of authenticated messages. Finally, we prove that quantum resources can improve both the
secrecy of the key generated by the PRG and the secrecy of the tag obtained with a hidden
hash function.
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